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On October 1st, 2017, the region of Catalonia held a referendum for its independence from Spain. Through this defiant 
referendum against the Spanish national government, millions of 
Catalans decided they wanted an independent Catalan Republic. 
The Spanish government headed by Mr. Mariano Rajoy avenged 
by nullifying Catalonia’s status as an autonomous community, and 
claimed direct rule over it. Yet, on the 27th of the same month, the 
region’s Parliament finally declared an independent Catalan state.
It is hard to know whether or not the Catalans will succeed in their 
independence movement. However, the momentum exhibited in 
the entire Catalan secession drive – by both Catalan independence-
seekers and opposing Spaniards– is clearly vehement. The yes-saying 
Catalans did produce an impressive display of civil disobedience, 
whilst the national police tried their best to stop the Referendum 
from taking place at all on the voting day (in evening thereof, Mr. 
Rajoy announced that “no vote had been conducted”, only to be 
contradicted by the later vote counts). The hail of rubber bullets shot 
by the police could not stop voters from smashing their way to ballot 
boxes. Catalan authorities claim that on the voting day alone, more 
than eight hundred people were injured in their clash against police. 
With a turnout rate of 43%, a 93% final “yes” rate to the independence 
call is telling. On the other side of the story, the Spanish Prime 
Minister, supported by countless Spaniards who have faith in the 
unity of a Spanish nation, is still trying his way to undermine the 
legitimacy of this move.
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Theorists and pundits still struggle to understand the event. Some 
have confirmed the national government’s dismissal of the Catalan 
claims to independence as illegitimate on grounds that the vote 
violates the extent of self-determination allowed for an autonomous 
community as prescribed in the Spanish Constitution of 1978. Some 
with a realist-like bent speculate that the Catalan government may 
use the independence drive as a bargaining chip with the national 
government. Others approach the Catalan’s desire for independence 
as an attempt to preserve Catalonia’s own sizable, vibrant economy 
from the stagnancy that plagues a struggling Spanish economy. 
These are all legit theories that support either the Catalan state 
or the Spanish government. However, we cannot fully appreciate 
the full picture of this chaotic independence drive by looking at 
what is happening in Catalonia alone. Instead, we must look at an 
underlying and much deeper conflict that is present globally – one 
between the post-national vision of unity and the recurring waves of 
nationalist awareness.
This theme is especially worthy of further exploration given the 
recent series of global events – from Brexit and Trump’s election 
to global Islamophobic sentiment. For several decades, the word 
“nationalism” has been seen as not only distasteful, but also as 
obsolete as a Walkman. Thinkers solidify that claim by declaring 
that the Western world has entered a post-national world, where the 
nation is dismissed as a mute category. Following this logic, liberal 
politicians have attempted several great transnational projects, 
and no doubt, the vision for European Integration is one of them. 
That very project rests upon the assumption that the discrepancies 
between European nations are small enough to be negligible, and 
thus a Europe without nationalist division is possible; following 
closely from that proposition is the radical call for the common 
market, supra-national governance and homogeneous culture 
around Europe. That would be a great picture of Europe’s future, 
if only it could be achieved. Hence, Europe in the post-war seems 
largely one-dimensional: one that is pushing itself to the vision.
II
Europe in the post-war era is characterized by the unchecked 
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progression of integration and super-nationalism (from the Roman 
Treaty that establishes the European Economic Community, 
through the Maastricht Treaty that establishes the European Union, 
to the creation and wide adoption of the common currency- the 
Euro), and the constant retreat of nationalism. That trend has 
stopped in the recent years, signaled by a series of global events. 
Britain’s decision to quit the European Union (EU) that signals 
the victory of Eurosceptic, the challenge posed by far-right Marine 
Le Pen in the French presidential race, and the strong show of 
anti-refugee Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany in the 
parliamentary election all point to the same fact: the nationalist 
sentiment, long regarded as obsolete in Europe’s political discourse, 
is back. Aside from the recent addition of anti-Muslim elements, this 
wave of nationalism takes on its tradition of Euroscepticism, that 
is, a fundamental distrust and opposition to the EU as a political 
entity and to European integration as an ideal. The independence 
movement in Catalonia does not simply add to that list; it shows an 
even more fundamental challenge to the creed’s post-nationalism. 
By that I do not mean the level of anger and agitation each side 
of this conflict has, though that 
is a visible aspect if we look 
up photos of rallies in 
Barcelona. What I do mean 
is that, not only that the 
man-made vision of a 
European federation is 
fiercely challenged, those 
multi-national states 
that have been there for 
long (e.g., Spain, which 
include the Basque 
and Catalan nations; 
the United Kingdom, 
comprised of England, 
Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland) are 
also at stake. Regional 
secessionism in multi-
What do you mean it's not made in 
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national western European states has not been active for decades, 
since Northern Ireland independence fights became quiet. Recent 
events in Catalonia motivate us to rethink the stability of multi-
national states, on which many have cast doubt. The much more 
radical and demanding idea of post-nationalism and the formulation 
of European integration based upon it are in serious trouble. After 
all, if we are no longer even sure whether a few nations can cohabitate 
if their national links are strong enough, how can we expect a good 
many of nations to form a community based on ideas alone?
III
In order to further appreciate the vision for a post-national 
Europe, I invite the reader to consider one of its most celebrated 
formulation, made by German intellectual Jurgen Habermas. In his 
book, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, Mr. Habermas 
crafts an image of what he calls “a universalist vision of political 
life”, that is, a kind of political structure that is neither bounded by 
territorial values or group identities. He recognizes that historically, 
people are either united because they are genetically linked to one 
another (familial identity in the narrower sense, or ethnic identity 
in a broader sense), or because they have been close both physically 
and personally. Resulting from that paradigm is a heavy reliance 
on group identity as the organizing principle of social and political 
lives. That is, each person is attached to one particular group with 
which he or she identifies, at the time becomes antagonistic to all 
other groups. With time going on, each group will develop distinct 
structures, customs, and discourses, and those differences will make 
it rather hard to have inter-group conversations. A foremost example 
of this kind of structure is the formation of nation-states, that is, 
the political states that exclusively join the member of a nation in 
the socio-cultural sense. In the perfect form, each nation-state has a 
distinct language that is not intelligible to people outside the nation, 
is highly intolerant of foreigners (because they are also members of 
other nations), and forbids global communication because it can 
undermine each nation’s purity.
Habermas’s liberal tendency makes him think of this as a 
horrible picture of the human condition. In a traditional political 
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vision under nation-states, each person lives under fragmentation. 
That person is bonded to the customs and traditions she has been 
brought up in, without the likeliness to think or live beyond what 
has been set forth for her. Following a tradition that stresses politics’ 
role in expanding human freedom, Habermas insists we think of an 
alternative political structure where each person is free to live up 
to his or her best physical and intellectual possibilities, without the 
hindrance of the particular condition that the said person lives in.
To make individual freedom achievable and a universal community 
possible, Habermas proposes the radical abolishment of particular 
grouping altogether. Instead of the status quo where human people 
identify with their nations and center their lives around them, he 
calls for all people to be united. To do that, each individual must 
take on shared, non-territorial values and be able to constantly 
communicate, so that a human community in its broadest sense (one 
that is inclusive of all human beings on earth) is possible. Countless 
thinkers have expressed an interest in creating a vision where “the 
world is one”, where the differences between the people around the 
globe will be reduced, or even eliminated, and they will be united 
into one single group. That properly characterizes the principle of 
post-nationalism, featured in the political thoughts of Soviet leader 
Leon Trotsky, Nobel-winning economist Paul Krugman, as well as 
Canadian statesman Justin Trudeau. Habermas’s brand of post-
nationalism is unique because it seeks to promote a new political 
order based on a global agreement for rational ideas, termed 
“verfassungspatriotismus” (literally, constitutional patriotism). The 
basic explanation for that term is the belief that political attachment 
"ought to center on the norms, the values and, more indirectly, 
the procedures of a liberal democratic constitution" (Jan-Werner 
Müller). It can be understood as a middle ground between the 
radical proposal of the global human community and the traditional 
formulation of nation-states. Unlike some other pro-globalization 
thinkers, Habermas does not champion the comprehensive abandon 
of grouping of individuals as a way of organizing the political sphere 
so that human beings are unified as one, because that idea is naïve 
in the sense that it pretends national differences do not exist. He 
does recognize the importance of the affection one has for the group 
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to which one is attached (in the case of the nation-state, this is often 
termed “patriotism”). What Habermas does support, is a new kind 
of grouping and love thereof. He believes that the identity based on 
rational political belief will finally supersede the identity based on 
ethnicity, culture, and civil life.
Here, we must briefly digress unto explaining what Habermas 
means as “the identity based on rational political belief”. As a 
thinker whose main academic training is in continental philosophy, 
Habermas’s vision of politics is deeply rooted in his theory of 
human nature, for this has been the traditional approach of political 
philosophers, ever since Thomas Hobbes. Specifically, Habermas 
is committed to the idea that each individual of the human species 
possesses a rational faculty that allows reasoning, and that person is 
endowed with the ability to communicate what he or she gets out of 
that reasoning process. Therefore, Habermas argues, we can expect 
them to each work out a rational system of political formulation, and 
together come to an agreement on the basic institutions of politics – 
laws, rules of governances, values, and the state apparatus – together 
known as the human species’ common constitution. Because each 
person comes into that agreement not under coercion or custom, 
but because of his or her personal consent, we can expect that 
person to love that system of rule of the constitution, a sentiment 
that Mr. Habermas denotes “constitutional patriotism”. Following 
the State of Nature principles of such great thinkers as John Locke 
(whose thoughts largely inspired American founding fathers) 
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Habermas grounds the advantage 
of constitutional patriotism (again, in which people are willingly 
united after thinking for themselves) over national patriotism (in 
which people are united only as a default set forth by traditions and 
blood ties) because the former involves each individual’s volition 
in their self-determination. That is, states are formed because of 
each subject’s consent to the political principles by which those 
states were founded. The legitimacy of post-national state will be 
the equal recognition of a common political culture, in the place 
of traditional national culture, as the organizing principle of 
citizenship. Unlike Max Weber’s classic definition of the state as a 
“monopoly on violence” that coerces the citizens to remain stable, 
Habermas implies that it is acceptable that people are entitled to 
the freedom of leaving those states if they no longer identify with 
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those principles; Habermas reasons that they will not, because the 
structure of human rationality dictates that we will land on the same 
political beliefs by rigorous contemplation alone, assuming no selfish 
consideration interferes with that reasoning process.
In the light of Habermas’s theory of post-nationalist constitutional 
patriotism, it would be easy to understand the particular stance 
he takes as a globalist in relation to the vision of politics. More 
sophisticated and nuanced a thinker than some radicals, Habermas 
does not blind himself from admitting differences of blood or 
historical experience or creeds of faith do exist; however, he believes 
it is possible – as well as desirable – that we progress into a new 
phase of history, where political attachment is based on loyalty to a 
constitution. It can be implied that rather than traditional nation-
states, Habermas prefer super-national federations as the basic 
mode of political states, in which consent to the same political 
beliefs provides the cohesion to the community. Hence, Habermas 
promotes a particular brand of globalism, that is, supra-national 
federation.
The best real-world example of the attempt to establishing 
a supra-national federation is the attempt to integrate Europe. 
Indeed, Mr. Habermas believes there exists a strong centripetal 
force as a recurring theme in Europe’s history. Despite the multitude 
of nations inhabiting that Europe, he observes they all live up to 
the same “European ideal”. It is no coincidence that Europe has 
the highest concentration of liberal-democratic regimes; that is 
explainable by the wide subscription the liberal-democratic ideals has 
on that continent. In that sense, Habermas thinks of his own theory 
a continuation of Europe’s great tradition: no matter what language 
one speaks, what church one goes to, or what kind of life one leads, 
one identifies as a European, embodied by the constitutional code 
that is deeply rooted in one’s minds. Conversely, Habermas believes 
that Europe is the best field where his constitutional patriotism 
theory can be applied to the real world. If a post-nationalism state 
can be realized anywhere, a Europe under integration must come 
first.
IV
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Even Habermas himself is not fully sure whether any super-
national alliance will be a success, not to mention the much 
more ambitious project of European integration. He writes that, 
globalization alone does not make a political order good; much 
more is required so that a liberal democracy can survive a post-
national world. In his essay "Zur Verfassung Europas" ("On Europe's 
Constitution"), he argues that the pressure posed by political and 
financial crises have allowed power to quietly shift from people to 
the hands of questionable legitimacy, such as the European Council, 
that are full of technocrats without concern for the real issues 
and the reverence for the constitutional rules by which European 
integration was formulated in the first place. Instead of making a 
true European democracy possible, he complains, 
the European community has been compromised 
by the frenzy of a few. This is effectually a quiet 
coup d'état against the trust each state has invested 
in the common European platform. Conversely, 
he believes the corruption at the center of the 
European platform is the cause of widespread 
Euroscepticism. It is because people who have 
trusted the idea of an integrated Europe now 
feel betrayed by the European bureaucracy that 
anti-European-integration sentiments are now 
popular. To tackle that problem, Habermas 
urges international citizenry, by which the 
constitutional integration of European nations 
is made possible, to take actions in solidarity 
and fight back the power from the European 
bureaucracy.
Habermas’s account does identify a core 
problem of any super-national entity, be 
it a multi-national state that was formed 
on political grounds, or the federation of 
an integrated Europe with constitutional 
patriotism as its bond. Wherever there 
is a political union, there is a common 
decision-making mechanism. In a 
No, I got all these 
injuries from 
voting, not from 
sportsball.
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dictatorship, it is the supreme leader; in a monarchy, it is the king 
or the queen; in a parliamentary democracy, it is the representative 
government. No matter to what degree a government represents the 
will of the people, as long as it is comprised of real human beings, it 
has its own interest. That is the source of the constant antagonism 
between the people and the government, as noted by many American 
libertarians. This is also the problem Mr. Habermas has with the 
European bureaucracy. However, there is an even more serious 
problem that he fails to recognize: when a political community is 
multi-national, the question of the disparity between nations comes 
into play. Even though the decision-makers are perfectly selfless, 
they are unlikely to make every group feel as though they have been 
treated fairly in all cases. This constitutes part of the motivation the 
Catalans rise in rebellion against the Spanish state.
This neglection in Habermas’s account is not unexpectable. As 
a believer of post-nationalism, Mr. Habermas is committed to the 
belief that nations are no longer one of the fundamental categories 
(if it is one of the categories at all) in today’s political life; hence, he 
is reluctant to think in a nationalist’s terms. In that discourse, the 
Catalans’ anger is solely explainable by the Spanish government’s 
An ideal city
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betrayal of democratic ideas (for the latter have attempted to 
undermine the region’s autonomy) and its unfavorable economic 
policy given to that region. Similarly, Britain leaves Europe only 
because EU’s bureaucratic working method is at odds with the UK’s 
needs for economic advancement, and alt-right dogmas become 
viral only because people do not want a large population (with no 
regard to what that population consists of). Those are all of course 
valid theories, but they only count as part of the explanation.  It 
is clear that in our age that nationalist thinking is still a common 
mode thought in politics. It is simply too radical an idea for political 
thinkers to assume we already live in a post-national world. Real-
world political events, such as what happened in Catalonia in the 
past October, seem further confirming that we are not. In such 
a world, to deny the existence of nationalist thinking is only to 
promote hypocrisy and self-blinding from the truth, both unworthy 
of Mr. Habermas as a social scientist.
V
Half a decade before Habermas even rose to prominence, the 
conservative German jurist Carl Schmitt has warned the world of 
the dangers of what he terms “political universalism”. In his 1932 
book The Concept of the Political, Schmitt argues that “the high points 
of politics [are where] the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized 
as the enemy”. By that he means that the friend-enemy relation is 
fundamental to the political sphere, because it is by the concrete 
recognition of the other as enemy that one can establish one’s own 
identity. Therefore, any attempt to deny one’s adherence to a nation 
(qua identifying with a group of friends) in opposition to members 
of other nations (understood as “enemies”, though not necessarily 
with hostility) risks losing all personal and communal identities. 
An identity-less person, according to Schmitt, cannot lead a public 
life, nor can the said person even assert his or her own status as a 
human being. In other words, any attempt to suppress national 
identities will result in massive and catastrophic depoliticization and 
dehumanization.
In Schmitt’s account, post-nationalism in specific is a more 
dangerous type of anti-identity sentiments, because it claims 
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to speak in the name of “universal humanity”. Recall, from Mr. 
Habermas, the vision for constitutional patriotism rests upon the 
premise that all human beings can use their rational faculty to work 
out a global agreement for political arrangements and thereafter 
love the political order based on the agreement. Mr. Schmitt 
suggests that ideas like Habermas’s refers to “humanity as such, and 
[it] as a whole has no enemies”. If that were accepted, he continues 
“‘Humanity’ would become an asymmetrical counter-concept. If one 
discriminates within humanity and thereby denies the quality of 
being human to a disturber or destroyer, then the negatively valued 
person becomes an unperson, … and must be destroyed”. That is to 
say, Schmitt is alerted of the danger of a radical tyranny inherent to 
all ideas of rule by universal humanity, including that of Habermas: 
if anyone is opposed to the post-national political arrangements, 
which, according to Habermas, is to be a human consensus, then 
that person violates the human consensus, can therefore disqualifies 
him or herself from even being human. In such a world, no diversity 
will be accepted and anyone with a dissent view will be regarded as 
the common enemy of all of the humankind. All that can be resulted 
would be massive killings and brainwashing aimed at eradicating all 
differences, just as what happened in France under Robespierre, or 
in Russia during the Soviet era.
VI
After the independence drive in Catalonia, we are forced 
back to reflect on the post-national vision for a unified Europe. 
Post-nationalism, at least as Habermas understands it, requires 
ethnic identities be replaced by rational-ideological bonds as the 
cornerstone of state-formation. Whether that political theory is valid 
remains up to debate. Yet, we must admit that post-nationalism is 
not the reality. The idea that we now live in a world beyond national 
and ethnic divides is nothing more than a preposterous pretension; 
radical pushes toward European integration, without regard for 
national awareness, will surely prove to be unwise.
